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“The day is not far off when Netanyahu and his followers will 
set up roadblocks at the entrance to Arab villages to tie Arab 
women’s tubes and spray them with anti-spermicide.  
 
Ahmed Tyby ; Hadash Party; commenting on speech of Netanyahu. 
(Alon & Benn, 2003) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Demography and security are two categories inextricably linked to each other in 
Israel. The fear of losing the Jewish majority has implications for the population 
politics, migration policies and above all, it affects the relationship with Palestine 
and the Arab minority within Israel’s borders. With the help of discourse analysis 
and a theoretical tool the aim is to frame intersecting oppressions of gender and 
race. Demography with its associated practices can be used as a disciplinary tool 
to stratify its citizens. By studying political policy documents from the 1970s until 
today, this thesis examines discursive changes and similarities in the material, 
mainly concerning the Arab Israelis. The material deals mainly with issues of 
security and demography.   
The overall picture is that the dominant racialized stereotypes have not changed in 
any fundamental way; the Arab minority is still perceived as a demographical and 
economical problem. We have found that women are only mentioned together 
with reproduction and unemployment. Women are the main target for a colonial 
modernization discourse, connecting essentialized ideas of “Arab culture” with 
high birth rates and poverty.  
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1. Introduction 
 
We started this long and winding road with an article last spring in 2012. The title 
was “Save the Jews: don't have an abortion” (Rothschild, 2011). The reporter 
examined the anti-abortion movement in Israel, with focus on the two biggest 
organizations, Efrat and Be’ad Chaim, both based in Jerusalem. The title of the 
article was pregnant. We started looking into the arguments of these anti-
abortionists and a new world opened up for us, filled with articles, opinions and 
books on the issue of Jewish and Arab birth-rates. The terms “demographic threat” 
and “Israel” on a preferred search engine generate an endless amount of more or 
less substantial information on the issue. The webpage of Efrat contains various 
arguments against abortion, most of them religious, but one section is devoted 
especially to “The critical demographic factor” (2005), where they argue that the 
Jewish State is under a “demographic threat” due to much higher Arab (Israeli) 
birth-rates. They then go on by stating that “Israel has lost more than one and a 
half million Jewish children to abortion since 1948” (Ibid.). 
 
The discourse was not completely new to us, also in Europe it is not unusual to 
hear politicians talking about the numbers of babies that “Arabs” get. But it made 
us curious that there was in Israel, a country that since its creation has been 
involved in many external conflicts, a notion that the threat might actually be 
coming from the inside, from its own citizens, from babies. We wanted to know 
more.   During our further reading, we slowly realized the importance of 
demography in the region, and its historical roots. At the same time, the feeling 
that women (and their bodies) were being used in a game of high politics, and not 
necessarily religion, grew stronger (many gender scholars have written about the 
relationship between gender and nation. See for example Cynthia Enloe 2007, 
Maria Stern 2001 and Caroline Moser 2001). We find the demographic argument 
of Efrat outrageous, because of the fact that it puts an enormous burden on the 
individual female, as if she has a duty towards the state to bear children no matter 
what. Luckily it seems like they are an exception. Abortion is legal in Israel only 
after the approval of a special committee, which consists of a social worker, a 
religious authority and a physician (Sperling, 2010, p. 369). In practice however, 
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the absolute majority of the applications are approved1, and no real political 
debate exists to change that practice. Demography though, is severely discussed 
and plays a major role for both Israel and Palestine in the process of state-
building. And demography is in the end about real people. 
 
With this study we want to examine the ideologies behind the term “demographic 
threat” and how it is connected to the Israel’s identity project, and also how the 
colonial heritage effects the position of the Arab minority in Israel. This thesis is 
not about statistics, nor about actual demography. It is about the discursive role of 
state institutions and its function of organizing human life into categories. It is 
also about how demography became a vital national interest. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
1
19,311 out of 19,575 applications were approved in 2010 according to the Central 
Bureau of Statistics (http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/cw_usr_view_SHTML?ID=595 
[2013-01-12]). 
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1.1 Aim and Query 
The aim of this research is to show how racial and gendered images are 
discursively produced and reproduced in an Israeli political context. From an 
intersectional and postcolonial understanding of gender and ethnicity we want to 
examine how the Israeli Arab, as a member of a minority group, is constructed in 
political policy material concerning the matter of demography and national 
security. Our main queries for our study are;  
 
 
 What kind of racial and gendered images are discursively constructed in 
our material?  
 What discursive similarities and differences can be found, and what does 
this tell us about changes in Israeli society? 
 How do these images correlate with the construction of a univocal national 
subject in our specific context?  
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1.2 Contextual Background 
 
Israel was declared an independent Jewish state in 1948. The Declaration of 
Independence was then followed by the Israeli Law of Return which gives every 
Jew a right to Israeli citizenship, no matter where they are from (Yuval-Davis, 
1987, pp. 61-62). The idea of Israel as a state for the Jewish people is a Zionist 
idea that developed in the second half of the nineteenth century in central Europe. 
Shlomo Sand describes it as a “part of the last wave of nationalist awakening in 
Europe” (2010, p. 252). Interesting enough, at the same time there were also a 
leftist Jewish movement who demanded cultural autonomy for the “people of 
Yiddishland” rather than a single independent state for all the Jews in the world 
(Ibid, p. 255). But in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Great Britain finally 
supported the Zionists idea of a homeland for the Jewish people in what was then 
the British Mandate of Palestine and opened up for European Jewish immigration 
(Fargues, 2000, p. 444). Today, after two wars and the occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza the borders of Israel together with the country’s demographic 
character have dramatically changed. A large part of the Palestinians has fled the 
country during the years, and nowadays the Arab minority (with citizenship) is 
currently about twenty percent of the total population in Israel.  
 
The idea of a Jewish democratic state requires a constant Jewish majority within 
its borders. To uphold the majority there are two main conditions: control over 
reproduction and control over migration. It also requires control of the population 
“on the ground”; all Israeli citizens have both ethnicity and religion in their ID-
cards. Israel has a pro-natal policy in many aspects, but so far immigration of 
Jews, Arab emigration during the 1948 war and refusal to completely annex the 
West Bank and Gaza has upheld the Jewish majority (Orenstien, 2004, p. 43). 
Israel's pro-natal approach has several historical origins, Zionism being only one 
of them2, Judaism is another. With a long history of persecution and with the 
                                                                                                                                     
 
2
 The first Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was a big fan of Jewish motherhood and called it a “unique 
destiny” (Abdo, 2011, p. 33). In 1949 he also founded a “Heroine reward” for every mother who 
delivered their tenth child. This was abolished after a few years when it became clear that the 
award-winners were mostly Arab women (Sperling, 2010, p. 365). 
  5 
unimaginable genocide that followed with it, demography has shaped Israel’s 
Jewish identity (Yuval-Davis, 1987, p. 83). 
 
Our material is political policy documents written by the state or state-like 
institutions with focus on the Arab minority and internal/external threat to Israel. 
Our intention was to compare those with a report that came out in 1965 in the U.S. 
called the Moynihan Report (1965). It was written by an U.S. official at the 
Department of Labor, Patrick Moynihan, who wrote a seventy pages long 
sociological study on what he called “the Negro Family” and its dysfunctional 
structure. Also in this case, there was a claim that a poor minority with too high 
birth-rates posed a demographical “problem”. Because of space and some 
methodological problems we decided not to compare them, but we found some of 
the theoretical tools from the Black feminist Patricia Hill Collins (2002) very 
useful. She has written about the Moynihan report and US White family politics, 
and even though our political and regional context is different, some aspects are 
similar.   
 
1.3 Earlier Research 
 
Our field of research that we position ourselves within has produced a severe 
amount of literature, spanning from minority rights, reproductive rights, 
nationalism, motherhood to violence against women and more. Another modern 
field of interest, though not relevant to our thesis as such but much discussed 
within the Israeli society, is the tradition of IVF-treatment3. Authors like for 
example Larissa Remennick (2000) and Daniel Sperling (2010) view the high 
numbers of IVF-treatments in Israel, and the subsidiaries given to people up to a 
late age, interconnected with the Israeli states tradition of pro-natal policies. So 
how is this relevant to us?   
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
3IVF is short for “in vitro fertilization”, a process where an egg is fertilized by sperm 
outside of the body. The per capita ratio of treatments in Israel is among the highest in the 
world (Remennick, 2000, p. 823).   
  6 
 
When reading about the demographic question within an Israeli context, 
discussions about reproduction and (mostly) the female body come up. Although 
both Remennick and Sperling write about a subject that can seem quite narrow, 
the political and social context surrounding the practice of IVF is interesting to us, 
and it is directly linked to the “the demographic problem” discussed earlier. 
Remennick describes it as follows: 
 
The unique constellation of Jewish religious tradition, demographic competition 
with the Arab neighbors, fear of child loss in the military conflict, and children-
centered everyday culture have sustained relatively high fertility level among Israeli 
Jews (2000, p. 822). 
 
The politics of reproduction is in this sense important to our own research because 
it is connected to demographic concerns and a fear that the minority of the Israeli 
Arabs could at one historical point outnumber the Jewish majority. As the author 
above concludes this has an effect on governmental policies towards its citizens 
and can be perceived as an “invasion” of the private realm (Remennick, 2000, p. 
837). Our chosen feminist theories on reproduction and population control will be 
elaborated in the theory section. Sperling similarly argues that: 
 
Israeli women accept this order of priorities in which security, nationalism, and 
demographic superiority over enemies outweigh women’s issues, and they adhere to 
policy constraining their own choices and preferences (2010, p. 364). 
 
Remennick’ research is interview based, using Goffman's stigma framework, and 
she is mainly focusing on Jewish women. Sperling's interest is in reproductive law 
and ethics in the Israeli society.  With our thesis we want to capture the 
connections between state practices, demography, the national subject, race and 
gender, drawing upon authors like the ones above, but with a different theoretical 
framework. While we focus on the notion how the idea of demography shapes 
state practices, many of the studies above are anthropological or historical. 
 
We would also like to mention two contemporary Palestinian scholars that have 
influenced our work and thinking; Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh with Birthing the Nation 
(2002): Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel and Nadera Shalhoub-
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Kevorkian with Militarization and Violence against Women in Conflict Zones in 
the Middle East (2009). Kanaaneh was one of the first authors we read, and even 
though it is more descriptive, framing the narratives of Palestinian women living 
in Israel. Her analysis of women’s resistance while navigating through different 
discourses of gender and race is constructive. Shalhoub-Kevorkian on the other 
hand focuses on male violence against women in the Palestinian society. She 
identifies patriarchal structures within the society and its historical roots. Her 
work is interesting because it frames patriarchal notions as well as how these 
interrelate with the forces of occupation and how that strengthens power 
structures of gender. Our theses draw ideas from both of these authors, but our 
material differs from theirs. They draw upon narratives and interviews’ while our 
material consists of policy material. 
 
 
2. Methodological Considerations 
2.1 Discourse as Concept 
The concept of discourse is widely used in social sciences, and has a variety of 
meanings and orientations. Basically, it is a notion that our language is structured 
in patterns. Those patterns only have a meaning when they are put in relation to 
each other and in a certain context. We affiliate ourselves to the social 
constructivist approach that there is no objective truth. Michel Foucault states that 
truth is a discursive construction and different regimes of knowledge determine 
what is true and false (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 13). From this definition we 
can understand how language and discourse are related to power and different 
power structures. What is and can be said or written by whom in what context, 
limit our way in thinking and acting. However, text and discourse is not the same 
thing, and text is not power in itself but may reflect, reproduce or question power 
(Bergström & Boréus, 2005, pp. 306).  
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Language constructs patterns of social relations but also reconstructs them and in 
that sense it has a constitutive meaning. Brian Paltridge points out “…the ways in 
which what we say as we speak contributes to the construction of certain views of 
the world, of people and, in turn, ourselves” (Paltridge, 2005, p. 1). In between 
construction and reconstruction lies agency and through our way of using 
language in different situations we have a possibility to change our way in 
understanding the world and how the world make sense to us (Bergquist, 
Lövheim, Sveningsson, 2003, p. 121). Agency is also one well debated subject in 
discourse analysis, a discussion which concerns the question of how and to which 
extent language is a constitutive force and whether agency is accessible and to 
who in a given context. Our material, like all texts spoken or written, make their 
meanings against the background of other texts and things that have been said on 
other occasions. All texts are therefore in an intertextual relationship with other 
texts (Paltridge, 2005, p 13). 
 
To study the relation between discourse and social and cultural developments in 
different social domains, we have decided to apply a critical understanding of 
discourse analysis. There were mainly two reasons for this decision; first of all 
critical discourse analysis does not understand itself as politically neutral, which 
will be discussed further on and secondly, because discourse functions 
ideologically. Critical discourse analysis claim that discursive practices contribute 
to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between social 
groups, for example between social classes, ethnic minorities and the majority and 
between sexes. These effects are understood as ideological effects (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2002, p. 63). 
 
2.2 Discourse Analysis – a Critical Journey 
 
Discourse and ideology are crucial concepts in our study. We’ve decided to use 
Norman Fairclough’s definition of ideology as constructions of meaning that 
contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of 
domination (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 63).  Our focus for the thesis is 
governmental policy papers. Since the documents are more or less outspoken in 
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their ideological foundations our main focus is to apply a critical discourse 
analysis. Through this we aim to frame the sometimes less outspoken power 
relations between actors positioned in the documents, or in other words to 
“reveal” the “true face” of the ideological foundations.  
 
When searching for ways and means to help us with this challenge we stumbled 
over Norman Fairclough’s discursive tools; transitivity and nominalization. 
Transitivity focuses on the events and processes that are connected (or not 
connected) with subjects and objects. In other words, which groups or individuals 
are phrased as active or passive agents? How are they described and how are they 
positioned? Are they subjects or objects? And what kind of characteristics are they 
ascribed with? Furthermore, Fairclough describes nominalization as another 
linguistic feature that reduces agency and hides the active agent. This can have the 
effect that the text signals “truth” and “common sense” with the causality and 
responsibility left unexplained. (Fairclough, 2001, pp. 103-105) These tools can 
become useful for us when analyzing our texts because we wish to examine what 
kind of discursive practice and knowledge are produced, and how these are used 
to maintain power structures and also potentially change them. Finally, to what 
extent ideological discourse becomes naturalized depends on the power of the 
social groupings whose ideologies and whose discourse are at the issue. In other 
words, what comes to be “common sense” is thus in large measure determined by 
who exercises power and domination in a society or an institution (Fairclough, 
2001, p. 76).  
 
When trying to outline our methodological considerations and especially when 
discussing the discourse analysis we find it hard to separate the methodological 
discussion from the theoretical. But as Jørgensen and Phillips stress; discourse 
analysis is not only a method for data analysis but rather a theoretical and 
methodological whole, a “complete package”. Researches must accept that theory 
and method are intertwined (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4). One example of 
this is our theoretical tool “Controlling Images” which we will use to identify 
discursively constructed images of the Israeli Arabs in our material. (The 
discussion about controlling images will be further elaborated in the theoretical 
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chapter). When analyzing our texts this theoretical tool will also function as a 
methodological tool, helping us to frame discursively constructed images.   
 
 
 2.3 Framing the Discourse - some positional 
considerations  
 
Bergström & Boréus distinguishes five basic elements to consider when 
interpreting a specific text: the text, the social context in which the text has been 
produced, the sender, the recipient and finally the interpreter (Bergström & 
Borèus, 2005, p. 24). We have discussed the social context in our background 
section, and will further develop these elements in the coming material chapter, 
but we would like to take the opportunity to say something about the interpreter. 
As interpreters of the text we have to be clear on our own positioning. Our own 
assumptions in the matter influence our understanding of the text and the context 
in which it was written; just as we as well are historical and social subjects. 
 
Even though discourse is defined and applied differently depending on the theme 
and among disciplines, discourses are often used in a sort of undefined, blurred 
sense, where both the author and the object can seem invisible when a text is in 
focus. Our standpoint is emancipatory and our critical discourse approach “aims 
to uncover the role of discursive practice the maintenance of an unequal power 
relations” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 64). Our choice of theories reflects in 
many ways our positioning and the general assumptions underlying our thesis. 
 
Unavoidable, our analysis will be influenced of our contextual and intertextual 
understanding of the issue. Even if we possess contextual knowledge, it doesn’t 
necessarily improve the study. Even though context knowledge is vital for a 
constructive interpretation, it does not decide the notions, ideas or ideologies in a 
text, but should rather be seen as assistance to set the frames for reasonable 
interpretations (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, p. 27). We argue that there is a risk 
that ambivalent notions, or contradicting ideas “gets lost” in the surrounding 
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social and political context, as if that is the material and not the actual text. 
 
We want to clarify our position in relation to some critical issues. We both have an 
interest in the region and in the Israeli/Palestinian “conflict”. We have been 
engaged in solidarity work in the West Bank, travelled both in Israel and in 
Palestine. The small bits and pieces of contextual knowledge that we received 
during that time and the occupational violence that we experienced will of course 
influence our work in ways that are hard to foresee. But we are also of that 
opinion that the Palestinians living on the West Bank and the Palestinian minority 
in Israel with Israeli citizenship live under different conditions, they have a 
different modern history even though it is interconnected in many ways. They 
have different rights and obligations to the state of Israel, which shape their 
relation to the state and their political and social position. With that said, for the 
sake of the people we are talking about in this thesis, we want to comment on the 
question of definitions. We are aware that many Israeli Arabs identify themselves 
as Palestinians, even though they are Israeli citizens. This is not necessarily a 
contradiction. There are many words for this minority like Israeli Arabs, 
Palestinians, Israeli Palestinians, Palestinian Arabs etc., and this is for many a 
highly political question. We don’t want to impose any identity, but since our 
material refers only to the group as Israeli Arab and we have many quotes, we will 
also use this word, knowing that it is a discursive practice in itself.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, we take the idealist assumption that ideas and 
notions precede social actions and power relations and by analyzing our material 
we want to make underlying ideas about race and gender visible. Our aim is to try 
and not reproduce power relations that underlie identity categories and definitions, 
but rather to challenge them. 
2.4 Material 
Our research material consists of Israeli policy documents and reports, more 
specific the Koenig Memorandum and documents from the Herzliya conference. 
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When it comes to questions about security and demography in Israel and 
Palestine, there is plenty of material to choose from. These subjects have 
concerned the politicians, academics, media and the public for a long time. The 
Koenig Memorandum (Koenig 1976) is an 11 pages long (in)famous report which 
is frequently referred to as a major turning point in the relationship between the 
Israeli state and the Palestinian minority (Sa’di, 2003, p. 51). It was written by 
Yisral Koenig, then a Northern District Commissioner of the Ministry of the 
Interior in Israel, who in this confidential report presented several strategic goals 
and tactics aimed at reducing the influence and population of the Arabs in Israel. 
This report was leaked to the Israeli newspaper Al-Hamishmar and published on 
7
th
 of September 1976 (Ibid. p. 53).  
 
Furthermore, to include more recent material on the subject we have chosen to 
examine the official documents from the Herzliya Conferences, an annual security 
conference hosted by the IPS, Institute for Policy and Strategy, in the Israeli city 
of Herzliya. Almost all of Israel’s most important Jewish political and military 
leaders, as well as some of Israel’s intellectual leaders together with international 
guests, assemble to produce ideas and policies that could help Israel become 
stronger and more secure
4
. Demography, being a question of security in Israel, is 
continuously one of the main issues. Steven Rousso-Schindler writes: “The 
continuing demographic problem was one of the reasons that led people in 
different sectors of the Israeli elite to convene the Herzliya Conference in 2000”  
(N/A, p. 12). This is how Herzliya present themselves: 
 
The Herzliya Conference is a center stage for policy assessment and analysis on 
Israeli and Middle Eastern and global affairs, and a catalyst for policy 
implementation. The cumulative product of the Herzliya Conference Series – the 
proceedings, reports, and policy recommendations – frames national discourse and 
policy debates and provides timely input into policy-making in Israel and abroad, at 
times with direct involvement of the senior team of the Conference (Herzliya 2009, 
p.4) 
                                                                                                                                     
 
4
Some of the participants and main speaker over the years have been Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud 
Olmert, Shimon Peres and Ariel Sharon. Some of the international participants are Nicolas 
Sarkozy, Jimmy Carter, Condoleezza Rice, José María Aznar, Carl Bildt, Li Zhaoxing, Franco 
Frattini, Salam Fayyad and Anders Fogh Rasmussen (IPS Herzliya, 2011). 
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Many have stressed the importance of these conferences on the national 
policymaking, debate and discourse in Israel (Rousso-Schindler, N/A, p. 5) and 
therefore we find these documents crucial for our study. The documents, called 
the Herzliya Series, consist of conference conclusions and executive summaries 
written by the IPS, and signed by the chairman of that year. We have included 
documents from nine conferences from the first in 2000 and until 2009 in our 
study. The 2005 document together with the three last documents, 2010, 2011 and 
2012, haven’t been published by IPS, and are therefore left out.  The Herzliya 
Series is easy accessed for everyone (they are all translated into English) and each 
document consists of 60 to 80 pages.  
 
Our material is comparable but not equal, which might have implications when 
analyzing them. The Koenig Memorandum was written in the framework of 
defining problems and proposing solutions by one Israeli department, the Ministry 
of Interior. As far as we know, it was never meant to be published and therefore 
we must assume that little has been left out in terms of “what the public shouldn’t 
know”. The intention was not debate, but action. The Herzliya documents on the 
other hand are reports from a public security conference with invited international 
and national speakers. Writing a summary means that certain part of the material 
is excluded, and when the Herzliya documents were composed, most certainly 
material from the conference was left out. The consequence for us as a reader is 
that the IPS decides what texts we are allowed to have access to. 
 
Many official documents in Israel are of course written in Hebrew. As neither one 
of us understand the language, our selection of material was unfortunately 
narrowed down. The language was also an issue when we in the beginning of our 
research considered interviewing women from Israel and Palestine about their 
thoughts on family planning, motherhood and citizenship. If we were to manage 
without an interpreter, we feared that our result would be based on information 
from the English speaking women only, which in this particularly study could 
give an unfair picture.  But due to the pages and time we had to our disposition in 
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this thesis we had to limit ourselves, and we therefore chose to focus on the above 
mentioned sources. 
 
In the end, our chosen material turned out to be quite substantial. Therefore when 
reading the documents we focused on subjects relevant for our study, mainly 
demography. Further, as we mentioned before the interpreter has a crucial role 
when working with texts and discourse analysis. This thesis has two authors, two 
subjects with possible different understandings of the text and different 
assumptions.  For that reason, we found it crucial that we both red the material 
individually and afterwards discussed our thoughts and opinions together.  
 
 
 
3.  Theoretical Framework 
 
In this section we will frame our theoretical understanding underlying our 
analysis. It aims to clarify our own assumptions on matters and connections 
relevant to our thesis, such as theories on the nation-state and its link to 
demographical concerns, gender and race. Our starting point will be Benedict 
Anderson's (2006) concept of the state as an “imagined community”, moving on 
to discussing the role of demography as a state institution with the power to 
stratify and categorize populations, both historically and in relation to our subject. 
We apply a Foucauldian perspective on control and discipline applied within the 
state structure; the theoretical approach of “biopower”. This kind of exercise of 
power is related to many aspects of population control including different forms 
of body control such as policies of birth control (positive or negative). This part of 
the theory section aims to frame the control of the body within a national context, 
through processes of genderfication and racification. Our last section is devoted to 
Hill-Collins (2002) work on “Controlling Images”, a theoretical and 
methodological tool that we will use when analyzing our material. 
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3.1 The State and the Community 
 
“A Nation...is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry 
and a common dislike of their neighbors.” - Karl Deutsch (in Sand, 2010, p. 1) 
 
The aim of this chapter is to frame the concept of “community” within an 
Israeli/Palestinian context. When we discuss the state in general, and the Israeli 
state in particular we want to position that nation-state in a certain time and 
context. The nation-state is not an ahistorical entity and as Benedict Anderson 
writes, it is an “imagined political community”. It is a modern political and 
communal structure, imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow-members...yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). A community, a nation-state, 
is not more or less, false or true, there simply is no origin. What distinguishes 
nations is not that they are imagined but how they are imagined (Ibid.). As 
mentioned above, there are many different communities within a nation and 
people may have several ways of identifying themselves, but according to 
Anderson, what keeps it legitimate in the eyes of its members is a “deep, 
horizontal comradeship” (Ibid, p. 7).  
 
This is not to say that all the members of a state has equal emotional connection to 
a state, or that they feel as a part of the state on equal grounds as any other group. 
This is especially interesting in the case of Israel, not because it is unique in any 
sense, but because we argue that Israel is in the process of becoming a state, (in 
our view, this is a process that never ends though. Nation-states constantly re-
define and re-event) at least in its relations to Palestine. Israel is a sovereign state 
but has no fixed borders, and the question of who belongs to the state under what 
conditions is still an open one. Israel, as a rather “new” state with a very diverse 
population, is in the process of writing its own narrative in constant negotiation 
with its many minorities, positioning them within a framework of different 
national identities. Balibar puts this formation into words: “No nation possesses 
an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations 
included within them, divided up among them or dominated by them, are 
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ethnicized – that is, represented in the past or in the future as if they formed a 
natural community” (1990, p. 349). Further, Ania Loomba argues that nations are 
special communities created not only to shape certain relationships but also to 
construct and remember certain versions of the past or more importantly; to forget 
certain historical narratives (2005, p. 221). We would argue that this “struggle” 
over history is an important part of the political and social context of Israel and its 
minorities today5. The production of a historical narrative is deeply embedded in 
power structures and relations of dominance. From a postcolonial perspective we 
view dominance not only as an economic one, as important are the production of 
culture, language and history (de Los Reyes & Mulinari, 2005, p. 66). 
 
3.2 The State and Statistics  
 
Shlomo Sand describes the national identity as “a modern lens through which the 
state makes sense of a diverse population” (2010, p. 41). The body of authority 
needs disciplinary tools to stratify its citizen, something that a field of scholars 
refers to as “biopower”. One scholar that devoted several texts and talks about the 
body and discipline is Michel Foucault. Foucault described statistics and 
demography as the “science of the state”, facts generated in order to “identify 
problems specific to the population” (Rousso-Schindler, N/A, p. 3). It can be seen 
as an exercise of power in order to survey and/or control a population as a whole, 
or parts of it. Theories of biopower argue that the modern state needs an 
institution of national statistics in order to create “the Citizen”, and statisticians 
need the authority of the state in order to practice its profession (Leibler, 2004, p. 
125).   
 
Foucault argues that since the nineteenth century and onwards, much of the 
regulations imposed by authorities were (and are) directed at populations and 
bodies in both a practical and metaphorical sense (Mills, 2012, p 83). They are 
                                                                                                                                     
 
5
One significant example is the attempt of the Israeli Ministry of Education to remove all 
references to “the Nakba” (“the Catastrophe”, referring to the war of 1948) from Arabic textbooks 
(Abdo, 2011, p. 154) 
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observed, surveyed and counted; statistics about people are quantified and 
structured into categories already constructed by the authority responsible for data 
collection. In this way, knowledge and control is produced and reproduced. 
Gathering statistics about a population is not a new phenomenon, and has for 
example been used to keep track of diseases, especially among the working 
classes in Europe. This is not only a way to improve the welfare of communities, 
but also has the effect of “tightening the discipline regime” among those on the 
margins, and as a result on the population as a whole (Ibid, p. 84). Hanna Herzog 
argues that “state practices of exclusion and hierarchisation vis á vis certain 
groups based on ethnic and national origin are no different than racism even if 
they hide behind the rhetoric of ‘belonging’” (2004, p. 54).  
 
The idea that statistics and demography is only a tool in the hands of the state is 
not shared by everyone. Anat Leibler argues that this often is the case, but not 
always and that in fact, the demographic body sometimes is an authoritative entity 
in itself. In Israel, the Central Bureau of Statistics was actually created before the 
state by a group of statisticians (Leibler, 2004, p. 121, 125), and with the 
legitimizing discourse of being a scientific, democratic and a-political institution 
it started an extensive population census with the help of the military. This census 
was the foundation for among other things, citizenship and identity card (Ibid., p. 
122). The demographic data collected is still used today. We do not want to go 
further into this discussion, but we think it illustrates quite well the importance of 
statistics and demography in the creation of Israel and its population categories. In 
relation to this and our material and the statistics presented, we would like to 
stress the importance of an intersectional understanding of social locations in the 
way Yuval-Davis present it:  
 
Social locations, however, even in their most stable format, are virtually never 
constructed along one power vector of difference, although official statistics – as 
well as identity politics – would often tend to construct them in this way (Yuval- 
Davis 2011, p. 13).  
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3.3 Modernity and the Body 
 
Benedict Anderson states that governmental tactics such as census has special 
relevance in colonial and postcolonial societies. Taxing has historically been one 
reason to carry out national census (the Ottomans were keen on that in the 
Palestine region), but other motives might be equally important. Anderson argues 
that after mid-19th century the interest of the European colonial powers changed, 
and they sophisticated the means of population control and surveillance. This new 
topographic demography was carried out by a “feverish imagining” bureaucracy, 
“building on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies” with the main purpose 
being ordering, classification and ‘othering’ as means of societal control 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 169). In the case of the people in the region of historical 
Palestine, several colonial powers before Israel (most recently the Ottoman, the 
British and the Jordanian Empire) had imposed their administrative legislation on 
their colonialized objects. The imprint of these occupying powers on population 
count remains to this day, and to this must be added the organizing and dividing 
policies of Israel (Zureik, 2001, p. 208). In this way, the demographical practices 
enforced by Israel can be seen as a continuation of already existing patterns of 
colonialism and Orientalism. 
 
In the nineteenth century demographical statistics was thought of as a liberal and 
democratic way of improving health and promoting equality among the citizens. 
In a colonial setting it got to signify the distinction between a traditional and a 
modern society, creating new, distinct social groups which could be compared and 
measured. This established new forms of inequality with certain groups labeled as 
a problem, or uncivilized (Leibler, 2004, p. 123). From this particular point of 
view, the (colonial) modernism has its own way of defining the “Orient”, the 
people and their habits. Quoting Said: “The Orient is infinite, uniform and lacks 
the capacity to define itself. Thus, one presumes that an extremely generalized and 
classified vocabulary to describe the Orient from a Western perspective is 
avoidable, even scientific “objective” (our translation) (Said, 1978, p. 443).   
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3.4 Demography, Gender and Race  
 
 
Demography is a subject where statistics are the main source of analysis. 
People and their practices become numbers in diagrams and lists. These 
numbers are then used for several reasons, often to promote or prove a 
political point. Behind the language of demography lies a reality of people 
divided into groups, often distinguished through citizenship, gender, 
ethnicity or whatever category the collector of data finds important. In a 
nation-state perspective, demography is also about reproduction, mortality 
and migration. Gender is an important aspect in all three of these categories, 
and our focus in this chapter will be on reproduction. Theory in general and 
feminist theory in particular have through the years produced severe 
amounts of literature on the “politics of reproduction”, with much of its 
focus on the restrictions imposed on individuals when demography, and in 
the end reproduction, become a national or collective concern (Davis 1982, 
Kanaaneh 2002). These theories draw a connection between population 
control policies and exercise of power. The aim for many of these studies 
are to expose some aspects of how dominant regimes of for example gender, 
race or class effects reproduction policies (Portugese 1998, p. 1). Feminist 
scholars have linked the personal to the political by deconstructing the 
dichotomy of private and public spheres (Fouron & Schiller, 2001, p. 539). 
The main concern has been how patriarchal structures in different societies 
restricts women's right to choose their reproductive way of life, be it a state, 
a collective or individuals (Portugese, 1998, p. 3). That does not mean that 
only women are limited by population policies, so are men, but as Nira 
Yuval-Davis points out, “women especially are often required to carry this 
‘burden of representation’ as they are constructed as the symbolic bearers of 
the collectivities identity and honor, both personally and collectively” 
(1997, p. 45). Ania Loomba discusses the role of women in relationship to 
nations and nationalism, arguing that women get to represent the “mothers 
of the nation”, i.e. reproducers of the nation (2005, p. 235). But in the eyes 
of states, not every woman is suitable to represent the nation, and definitely 
not to produce new citizens, as we shall see in the next chapter.  
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3.4.1 Birth Control vs. Population Control – a question of class, 
race and gender 
 
As mentioned before, Israel is far from the only nation to keep a close eye on the 
number of babies born in certain population groups and number of arriving 
immigrants from certain countries. The Moynihan Report is another example. The 
Afro Americans in U.S have a history of being monitored in different ways, 
especially when it comes to population growth. In the beginning of the 20th 
century, when the (White) women’s movement in U.S started to stress the 
importance of birth control, and women’s right to self-determination over 
childbearing, President Roosevelt accused them for promoting race suicide. He 
equated the falling birth rate among native-born Whites with a national death 
(Davis, 1981, p 209). But the presidents attempt to undermine the movement 
failed in that sense that it led to a greater support for its advocates. However, this 
controversy led to a greater separation between feminists and the poor working 
class. Firstly, the feminists were emphasizing birth control as a route to careers 
and personal goals, goals out of reach for the poor with or without birth control. 
Thus, the race-suicide episode was an additional factor identifying feminism with 
the aspirations of the more privileged women. Secondly, the pro-birth control 
feminists began to popularize the idea that poor people had a moral obligation to 
restrict the size of their families, because large families drain the taxes and charity 
expenditures of the wealthy (Ibid. p 210). In Israel, the government decided in 
2002 to implement a policy which made severe cuts in child allowances, based on 
the size of the family. It was argued that reducing subsidies for children will 
ensure Palestinian economic prosperity. (Rousso-Schindler, N/A, p 8) 
 
Many development theories and demography studies stress the importance of a 
low fertility rate to reach development and modernization of a society or 
community. For example, the Moynihan Report pointed out the benefits for poor 
Black women in U.S to have fewer children; the household economy would get 
better and the children would get a more promising future. This was the norm of a 
modern family, with the White middle class families in the States as the 
“successful” examples (Collins, 2001, 2002). Similarly, the modernization 
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discourse is strong when it comes to the fertility policies in Israel. One strategy 
employed in the 1990s by the government to reduce the gap between the Jewish-
Arab birthrates was to deploy discourses of modernization in the form of family 
planning, as a way to convince Palestinian citizens of Israel that high rates of 
reproduction are backward (Rousso-Schindler, N/A, p. 7). 
 
3.5 Controlling Images 
 
Power and power relations are a fundamental part of our theoretical discussion, 
but power is never just power. Power is complex and movable, visible and 
invisible. To be able to frame this ever changing concept we need a critical 
approach beyond class, gender or ethnic essentialism. When applying an 
intersectional perspective we widen the possibilities to identify discursive and 
material intersections which constitute power and perpetuate inequality. So how 
can we apply an intersectional view in our work? For this thesis we have included 
Patricia Hill Collins idea of so called controlling images, which is explained by 
her as an ideological system to justify intersecting oppressions of race, class, 
gender, and sexuality. These controlling images are designed to make racism, 
sexism, poverty, and other forms of social injustice appear to be natural, normal, 
and inevitable parts of everyday life (Hill Collins, 2002, p. 69). She mentions the 
importance of analyzing the particular controlling images applied to African-
American women in order to reveal the specific contours of Black women’s 
objectification as well as the ways in which oppressions of race, gender, sexuality 
and class intersect (Ibid. p. 71-72). We want to include this intersecting tool in our 
thesis because it can help us frame ideological discursive pictures of ‘the other’. 
As interpreters we conceptualize those pictures in order analyze them according to 
our specific context and material. But when doing this, the discursive norm is also 
conceptualized and made visible. Hill Collins talks about dominant paradigms of 
assimilation and modernization, and how an idea about a standard family form 
was shaped. Against this model of the “Normal White Middle-class” family, all 
other family structures were judged (Hill Collins & Solomos, 2011, p. 359).  
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Our understanding of controlling images is undoubtedly related to hegemony and 
hegemonic discourses. Hill Collins discusses controlling images as examples of 
hegemonic ideologies which appear as taken for granted. These ideologies are 
used by dominant groups to create and maintain a popular system of 
“commonsense” that support their right to rule. As she points out; “In the United 
States, hegemonic ideologies concerning race, class, gender, sexuality, and nation 
are often so pervasive that it is difficult to conceptualize alternatives to them, let 
alone ways of resisting the social practices that they justify” (Hill Collins, 2002, p. 
284). Even though Patricia Hills Collins doesn’t explicit connect controlling 
images and hegemonic ideologies with discursive power, we clearly see the 
connections. This system of “commonsense” which let some groups have a more 
hegemonic position over others is constructed and maintained through language 
and discourses, leading to actions and social practices. We apply a Foucauldian 
understanding of knowledge; it is never innocent and is always connected with 
operations of power (Loomba, 2005, p .42). ‘Knowledge’ generated about ‘the 
Orient’ in general and ‘the Arab’ in particular is an ideological accompaniment of 
colonial ‘power’. In this sense “Controlling Images” are produced and reproduced 
knowledge.  
Finally, controlling images are not to be seen as static categories, and at times it is 
hard to separate them because they are constantly dynamic and changing. We 
thought about different ways of structuring our analysis, and found it hard for 
several reasons. Separating ideas, notions and categories such as race, gender or 
class might endanger the intersectional approach because even though “these 
vectors has a separate ontological basis, the intersecting oppressions are mutually 
constituted by each other” (Yuval-Davis, 2007, p. 566). But at the same time, the 
theoretical tool has a strength we find useful for framing controlling discourses 
that serves to legitimize and naturalize intersected oppressions. It is therefore 
important to keep in mind that ”since the images themselves are dynamic and 
changing, each provides a starting point for examining new forms of control that 
emerge in a transnational context” (Hill Collins, 2002, p. 72). 
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4. Analysis 
 
In this chapter we will present the controlling images that we argue are the main 
intersecting representations in the material. These are structured as themes rather 
than the narrow gendered or racialized stereotypes, which is how Patricia Hills 
Collins tends to describe her controlling images. Our more wide understanding 
and implementation of this theoretical tool has the benefit of a more open reading 
of the material. We think that it allows a deeper and more dynamic understanding 
of stereotypical representations. However, our assumption is the same and we 
agree with Hill Collins when she’s quoting Carby; “that the objective of 
stereotypes is not to reflect or represent a reality but to function as a disguise, or 
mystification, of objectives social relations (Carby in Hill Collins, 2002, p. 69). 
Our themes are based on different representations that we saw were constantly 
recurrent in our material. The narrative constructs patterns of social relations but 
also reconstructs them as we’ve discussed in our methodological chapter. We will 
start with an examination of the Koenig Memorandum followed by a similar 
analysis of the Herzliya documents. The third chapter is a summary of the 
differences and similarities of our material, and finally we will proceed with a 
deeper theoretical analysis.  
 
 
4. 1 The Koenig Memorandum 
 
4.1.1 Dis-loyalty 
 
The report of Koenig begins with a claim that until very short ago, the Israeli Arab 
“had a high degree of identification with the state and had been drawn into its 
various frameworks”, but that: 
 
Recently certain phenomena have occurred which have challenged these 
assumptions and which have seriously question the loyalty of a large part of them to 
the state and to its very existence (Koenig, 1976, p. 190).  
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The term “drawn into” indicates that this was maybe not a mutual agreement, but 
was rather in the interest of the Israeli politicians. However, this integration is in 
danger because the Arab minority has gone from being passive to active, and is 
now according to Koenig dis-loyal to Israel. He also states that a large part of 
them wish for the elimination of the Israeli state. Koenig positions them as 
outsiders of the state with the ability to destroy the state without destroying 
themselves. This development was according to Koenig due to a failure of those 
dealing with the Arab sector, as they ignored:  
 
…the social problems in the Arab sector on the one hand, and lacking a long-term 
plan for the creation of an identity of a loyal Arab citizen on the other. (Ibid. p. 191)   
 
The reason for their dis-loyalty is interesting enough the fault of the Israeli 
government, they are in charge of and also capable of constructing the “loyal 
Arab” in their liking. Koenig concludes that the feeling of power among Israeli 
Arabs is a result of improved economy, and that power has been taken advantage 
of by “interested hostile elements” (Ibid, p. 194). The term “hostile elements” are 
not further elaborated by the author. He describes it more or less like a battle over 
the loyalty of the Israeli Arab, in which the object battled over has nothing to say. 
We argue that domination involves complex processes of objectification of a 
subordinate group where “identity narratives often constitute major tools of ethnic 
projects” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 44), and by creating collective boundaries and 
using identity narrative the world is divided between us and them (Ibid.). One 
controlling images of the Israeli Arab is the narrative of its naturalized disloyalty.  
 
Loyalty is referred to throughout the report as a problem and resistance from the 
Arab minority is met with claims of dis-loyalty as a way of undermining their 
voices. 
 
4.1.2 Fertility 
 
Another critical point for Koenig is the birth rate of the Israeli Arabs and the fact 
that they have a higher natural increase than the Jewish population (Koenig, 1976, 
p. 191). In one section, he problematize the payment of “big family” grants to the 
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Arab population. He only mentions this shortly, not explaining why this is a 
problem but we assume that Koenig objects to the idea that the Israeli state should 
pay for Israeli Arab further reproduction. Quoting Koenig: 
 
The government must find a way to neutralize the payment of “big family” grants to 
the Arab population, either by linking them to the economic situation or by taking 
this responsibility from the national insurance system and transferring it to the 
Jewish Agency or to the Zionist organization, so that the grant is paid to Jews only 
(Ibid. p. 195).  
 
Koenig's suggestion of cutting off Israeli Arab families from the welfare system in 
order to lower their birth rates was not the only recommended measure at the 
time. Koenig's recommendation is a clear example of a racialized population 
politics; no Arab child can be of interest for the reproduction of Israel as a 
(Jewish) nation. Yuval-Davis explains this connection between racism and 
nationalism as a way to construct minorities into “deviants” and excludes them 
from important resources (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 11). Demographically and 
economically they are a problematic group, and their birth rates and poverty is 
perceived as a threat to the majority. The Israeli state sees itself as a subject, an 
active agent with the legitimacy and power to control the Arab fertility. Shlomo 
Sand argues that this is a result of the domination of Zionism and “its particular 
concept of nationality”6 (Sand, 2009, p. 21). One quarter of the citizens is 
categorized as non-Jews, and through the notion of Zionism they are not included 
in the nation and cannot contribute to the Jewish community.  
 
 
4.1.3 Hostility 
 
This controlling image tends to describe the Israeli Arab as an active agent, 
contrary to the other images discussed above. Here, the dis-loyalty is outspoken 
and explicit and the sole role of the subject, the Israeli state, is to “handle” the 
hostility in ways it finds suitable.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
6
 As already mentioned Zionism is the national ideology of Israel, which states that Israel is a 
nation for the Jews.   
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The Israeli Arab is no longer passive and has gone over to nationalistic 
manifestations – only verbal at this stage – which have seen light in a number of 
events (Koenig, 1976, p. 192). 
 
 
The Israeli Arab minority is consequently associated with increasing hostile 
nationalism. We argue that Koenig uses the term nationalism in the document for 
different forms of resistance and these are described as opposed to loyalty. One 
can see this as a way to undermine and delegitimize social struggles, prevalent at 
that time. Koenig devotes a section of the report to the younger generations’ social 
revolt and their participation in unions and the communist party, RAKAH (1976, 
p.192). What he doesn’t mention is the fact that both the unions and RAKAH had 
members from both the Jewish and the Arab sector (The founding principles of 
the Communist Party of Israel, 2011). To repress nationalistic tendencies, Koenig 
has a few suggestions. For example, he argues for the government to “reduce the 
number of Arab students” and he strongly recommends to: 
 
Encourage the channeling of students into technical professions, to physical and 
natural sciences. These studies leave less time for dabbling in nationalism and the 
dropout rate is higher (Ibid, p. 196).  
 
 He then continues to stress the importance of repressing uprisings through  
 
…adopting tough measures at all levels against various agitators among college and 
university students (Ibid., p. 196). 
 
There is an evident fear of the uncontrolled object (being the Arab) in the report. 
Communication is not an alternative and Koenig proposes in our view harsh 
methods to gain control, reproducing the dichotomy of the “the good Arab”, the 
ones who obey, and “the bad Arab” who refuses to obey and who therefore is 
viewed as a terrorist (Said, 1976, p. 453). 
 
Further on, he recognizes the danger in “mixed arenas” such as factories, having 
Arabs together with the Jewish workers and suggests; 
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The increase of Arab worker in factories might accelerate the friction between Jews 
and Arabs and develop into uncontrolled incidents. The number of Arab employees 
should not exceed 20 % (Koenig, 1976, p. 195). 
 
Apparently, Koenig claims that as long as the Arab is partly kept out from 
workplaces and universities, the likelihood of uprisings diminishes. He connects 
subversive practices to the Arab mind.  
 
By the virtue of its Levantine7 character and due to social dynamics, this society will 
move from introversion to external manifestations and a possible move into 
organized violence is not be ruled out  (Ibid., p. 196). 
 
 The adjective “Levantine” is essentialized as being a characteristic of Arab 
culture, mind and society in a negative way connecting it with state destroying 
practices. This description is a process of nominalization where certain groups are 
ascribed with certain features, in this case essential characteristics. We argue that 
this controlling image derives from a dichotomy between the free-loving 
democratic Western subject and the evil totalitarian Arab, which is although not 
stated in the document, in our view male. Further on, Koenig doesn’t discuss the 
reasons behind this hostility or that the state might have some responsibility. 
Neither does he acknowledge the agency in this form of resistance, which we 
interpret the hostility to be. As Said states, there is no reasons to actually hear the 
voice of the colonized object, because the Arab is just an agitator trying to make 
things difficult for the colonial power (Said, 1978, p. 104). It can also be seen as a 
way to legitimize policy of domination.       
 
 
4.1.4 The Uncivilized   
 
Koenig mentions the “Levantinistic character” in several places in the document 
without further explanation, but it has apparent negative connotations. It is 
referred to in the context of the failed integration of the Israeli Arabs: 
                                                                                                                                     
 
7
 The word 'Levant' refers to the area of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan. Usual it is 
mentioned as a variant of spoken Arabic in this part of the Middle East.  (WIKIPEDIA, 12/12-12, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levant)  
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The [integration] policy did not take into consideration the superficial and 
Levantinistic Arab character whose imagination tends to exceed rationality (Koenig, 
1976, p. 193). 
 
Also in this passage, Koenig rejects (by not speaking of it) any notion that the 
state has, or will have, responsibility for integrating the minority. The report 
adopts the notion of an irrational Arab mind and refers several times to the fact 
that the Israeli Arab is in need of guidance. 
 
With the establishment of the state, the remnants of the Arab population in the 
country were left without a leadership (Ibid., p. 190) 
 
Koenig is not satisfied with the present leadership, calling them “big-mouthed 
Arabs” and states that this “transitory society needs leaders who can provide 
personal examples and who are capable of giving appropriate answers to sincere 
nationalists leading them toward a reasonable personal and public solution” (Ibid. 
p. 194). By “transitory society” he refers to what he calls the passage from an 
agricultural society to an industrial one. It is an inevitable process of 
modernization that the Arab minority has to go through in order to be civilized, 
and the way that the report discusses the Arab leadership reflects the idea that they 
themselves do not know their own good. Said traces this idea back to the time of 
the British colonial rule, and underlying assumptions about colonial rule and 
imperialism; that it is in fact for the sake of the natives that the imperial rule 
upheld their own leaders in the region. The imperial rule has saved them from 
their own deprivation (Said, 1976, p. 106). Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh makes a similar 
conclusion (set to modern times) and argues that Israel’s self-Occidentizing have 
relied on the Orientalization of its Arab minority, and the state has specifically 
attempted to constitute the Arabs as the flawed and failed object of reproductive 
modernization (2002, p. 252).  
 
The report concludes that this process is difficult but stresses the importance to 
learn from other countries': 
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One has to remember and learn from the experience of other states with national 
minority populations that exaggerated and uncontrolled liberalism does not achieve 
the intended end, but rather the opposite. And this rule applies particularly to the 
specific Arab minority in Israel (Koenig, 1976, p. 197). 
 
Minority population and “uncontrolled liberalism” are according to this quote not 
compatible, but we can only guess what the report means by that claim, or which 
countries it refers to.   
 
 
4.2 The Herzliya Series 
 
4.2.1 Dis-loyalty 
 
In the Herzliya documents we also find worries about the loyalty of the Arab and 
that the Arab still might be drawn between conflicting powers, fighting over its 
loyalty and identity. This conflict is perceived as followed: 
 
The findings of the Patriotism Survey8 show the conflict in national identity 
prevalent among the Arab Israeli public and the moderate positions it seems to be 
taking: The number of Arabs who define themselves as "very patriotic" toward the 
Palestinian people (48 percent) is twice as high as those that defined themselves as 
"very patriotic" toward Israel (24 percent). (Herzliya, 2006, p. 52) 
 
The Herzliya documents devote much time on elaborating on the statistical data 
from the survey, dividing them into numbers and categories. Worth noting is that 
in the actual survey, no figures are presented in one category but divided into 
Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs.  The quote above is interesting, not because of the 
data, but because it constructs an image of a conflict in national identity through 
simple statistics. We do not have a complete insight in how the survey is done, but 
presumably the question of divided loyalties is not asked to the Jewish majority, at 
least it is not submitted anywhere. The constant statistical separation of Jews and 
                                                                                                                                     
 
8
Every year, the Herzliya conference presents the annual survey on patriotism, conducted by the 
Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS). “The database collected over the years facilitates studying 
changes in public opinion, prevalent attitudes toward symbols of the State of Israel, and the 
connection of both Jewish and Arab communities to the country” (Herzliya, 2009, p.  39). 
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Arabs, and the assumption that these numbers of patriotism are a conflict to the 
Israeli Arabs, discursively construct the Israeli Arab as “the other, not to be 
trusted”. It also supports the idea that hybrid identities and double loyalties are not 
possible, it is rather seen upon with suspicion. Elia Zureik states that when 
colonial states, is faced with hybrid identities, it tries to “reconstitute them as 
fixed and singular categories by means of its control over certain means of 
enumeration” (Zureik, 2001, p. 213). 
 
Portraying hybrid identities as a conflict is also an effective way of delegitimize 
the Palestinian identity of many of the Israeli Arab, and denying them the dual 
identity of being both an Israeli and a Palestinian. The separation of these two 
identities by constructing them as opposed to one another is a strategy early 
implemented by the Israeli state. Nahlo Abdo argues that the state is trying to 
“Israelize” the Arabs by separating between Israeli Arabs and Palestinians (Abdo, 
2011, p. 44). The exclusion and the separation lies at the heart of the colonial 
project, she stresses, and control over demography is central to the states’ citizen 
regime (Ibid., p. 40). To further strengthen the dividing discourse between the 
Israeli Arab and the Palestinians, the tactic of denigrating the Palestinians living 
outside of Israel is used. 
 
It has also been claimed that Israeli Arabs have adopted the Palestinian national 
ethos, which denies the legitimacy of the State of Israel as a Jewish state and 
attempts to undermine its Jewish character, thus exacerbating tensions with the 
Jewish populace (Herzliya, 2003, p. 62). 
 
The insinuation that this hostile “national ethos” presumably shared by every 
Palestinian outside of Israel is trickling over into the Arab sector inside Israel, can 
work as a way of preventing people to “become Palestinian”, in other words, a 
threat to the state of Israel. Again is the heritage that many Israeli Arabs still 
identify with constructed as the enemy, making those Arabs in Israel dis-loyal to 
the state per se. We argue that surveys with this kind of disposition presented in a 
manner like the one in Herzliya, reproduces the idea that ‘the others’ have 
predisposed features, such as dis-loyalty.  
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4.2.2 Hostility and Uncivilized 
 
When analyzing the Herzliya documents we found that the images ‘hostility’ and 
‘uncivilized’ were harder to separate (important to remember is that we view the 
images as not static, but dynamic and overlapping, why a separation is always 
hard). The image of the uncivilized Arab had become less visible and more 
“rational”. That is why we found it more fruitful for the analysis to emerge these 
two images. However, the image of the Israeli (male) Arab as a potential violent 
threat is a frequent theme in both the Koenig report and Herzliya. Sometimes the 
threat is initiated from the outside, through what Herzliya labels as “the Muslim 
rage”. 
 
If the Muslims are capable of inflicting such harm upon each other every day in Iraq, 
for example, just think what they will do to those they perceive as enemies of Islam 
(Herzliya, 2007, p. 16). 
 
 
The ideology behind the hostile acts is no longer Communism as in Koenig report, 
but Islam. This follows a general trend since the end of the Cold War and the 
documents continues with the following statement:  
 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is part of the clash of civilizations (Ibid., p. 31).  
 
The collectivization and objectification of the Muslim Arab constructs Israel’s 
own Arab citizens as part of a cultural war between them and their state, picturing 
them as potentially hostile. ‘The other’ in this context is “perceived to express 
essentialist, innate traits deriving from the fact that s/he belongs to an ethnic, 
national, cultural or racial groups. S/he is marked as threatening to the social 
order, the dominant identity, and/or national security” (Herzog, 2004, p. 60). 
 
Edward Said has historicized the “essential, innate traits” back to oriental images 
of the Muslim Arab, where they are perceived as revengeful, conform and only 
able to function in situations of conflict (Said, 1978, p.123).  
 
Israel’s fear of their own population is expressed in the Herzliya document from 
2000: 
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The increase in the demographic share of the Arab minority in Israel tests directly 
Israel’s future as a Jewish-Zionist-democratic state. The security and social 
challenges connected with Israel’s Arab minority will probably worsen as long as the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is still simmering. The sense of discrimination extant in the 
Arab population is a fertile ground for increasing tensions and inquietude. In 
conjunction with political estrangement and sustained frequently by incitement, it is 
liable to manifest itself in a series of dangerous and hostile actions in terms of law 
enforcement and public safety (p. 52). 
 
The Arab minority is not only constructed as a threat to the state’s Jewish 
character in terms of demography, but also as potentially violent, again in relation 
to Arabs outside of Israel. In other words, as long as there is a “conflict” with the 
Arab world, which is not defined, the minority inside of Israel can never be 
trusted and they may turn violent. Democratic (Jewish) values are in opposition to 
the hostile, aggressive Arab collective. Samera Esmeir argues that to understand 
Israeli use of the word security and how non-security issues like for example 
memory (the Nakba-Law explained earlier) and demography are now a security 
concern, one has to historicize and contextualize the use of the term. Esmeir 
means that the term security in Israel can be used “without a need to reference the 
reasons for any of its particular operations” (Esmeir, 2004, p. 3). This is a process 
that we continuously find in the material, how groups, or practices and situations 
are described as threats without any further explanation.   
 
In this passage we have one of the few times where discrimination against the 
minority is expressed, but it is not presented as facts but as a “sense” in the Arab 
population – being ‘the other’ in this document deprives them of their agency and 
claims, a process of nominalization. In 2007 Herzliya comes back to the issue of 
in-equality but it is turned into a question of whether the minority will turn hostile 
towards Israel or not: 
 
An increase in the level of de-legitimization of the State of Israel appears to be 
discernible among the Arabs of Israel. /../ Some believe that the essence of the 
debate is not the question of equality between Jews and Arabs but rather a challenge 
to the very legitimacy of the state. Thus, even if the state continued to work toward 
reducing disparities, it would not win legitimacy (p. 35). 
 
Implying that the minority hides their agenda when they call for equality again 
undermines their agency, and their claims can be effectively dismissed as an 
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attempt to de-legitimize the state. It also insinuates that Israel is doing what it can 
to reduce inequalities, but that it might be a fruitless struggle because the Arab 
minority would never accept the state of Israel anyway. With this logic, equality is 
only of value if it benefits the majority and their security. Equality has no value if 
the main receiver/beneficiary is the minority, and it has no value in itself.     
 
4.2.3 Fertility 
 
As we’ve seen in the Koenig Memo the Arab woman was important for the 
demographic forecasts in Israel and this is still a fundamental topic in today’s 
Herzliya Conferences. Actually, it is only when discussing the birth rates of the 
Israeli Arab that the woman is made visible. (In fact, the Jewish woman is also 
invisible until the question of demography is on the agenda.) The demographic 
race between the Israeli Arab woman and the Jewish woman is described several 
times in the documents. But in contrast to the discourse of Koenig, the fertile 
woman in the Occupied Territories (the West Bank and the Gaza strip) is now also 
being monitored with anxiety by the Israeli authorities. For example, when 
discussing the possibilities of reaching a possibly accord with the Palestinian 
leader Yasser Arafat it is stated that: 
 
The Palestinian womb can triumph. So if this happens, we won’t be able to reach a 
comprehensive agreement (Herzliya, 2001, p. 71). 
 
Worries are expressed that the Israeli Arab “has adopted the Palestinian national 
ethos” and is now using their high birth rates to “deny the legitimacy of the State 
of Israel as a Jewish state and attempts to undermine its Jewish character.” 
(Herzliya, 2003, p. 62) It is obvious that the motherhood of non-Jewish women 
also has a national meaning, but that of a threat to the ideological foundations of 
the Zionist state (Berkovitch, 1997, p. 616). Comparing the Koenig Memo with 
the Herzliya documents, we find that the latter explicitly discuss the Arab Israeli 
woman. There are numerous quotes concerning her unemployment which is 
connected with high birth rates. “Improvements in education will lead to more 
women in the workforce and lower birthrates” followed by the advice that the 
“numbers of day-care centers in the Arab population should increase in order to 
get more women in the workforce” (Herzliya, 2003, p.57). The Arab woman is 
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constructed as an uneducated object, reluctant of working. It is described in the 
documents as a cultural problem;  
 
The employment rate among Arab women (around 17 %) is three times less than 
that of Arab males and Jewish women, probably as a result of the unique 
characteristics of Arab society (Herzliya, 2006, p. 51).   
 
But there is no further explanation what these unique characteristics are, what 
they are based on etc. Nahla Abdo explains that the women’s low rates of labor 
participation, and the related widespread poverty among this population, are often 
described in terms of religion/culture rather that structures and institutional 
factors. The Arab culture, patriarchy and religion are blamed for women’s low 
status in general. Actually, in 2012 there was a survey concluding that more than 
40 % of female Arab academics were unemployed (Abdo, 2011, p. 104, 111). In 
other words, a higher degree is no guarantee of a rewarding job. Another example 
in the construction of the passive Israeli Arab woman is when her unemployment 
rate is compared to the one of the Jewish Ultra-orthodox. Unlike the previous, the 
Ultra-orthodoxy’s low participation is out of free choice (Herzliya, 2002, p. 60). 
The modernization discourse is noticeable when framing the picture of the passive 
Arab woman; uneducated, backward, controlled and with Third World high 
fertility. We argue that since women often carry ‘the burden of representation’ “as 
they are constructed as the symbolic bearers of the collectivities identity and 
honor” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 45), they often become the target of governmental 
policies of modernization. They, and not the men, are made responsible for 
‘backwardness’ or disapproved behavior or actions from the collective they 
represent. On the other hand, they can never get to represent the nation of Israel. 
Our main point is that their ethnicity disqualify them from being considered 
symbolizing the nation, instead they are producers of the population that threatens 
the national interest of maintain itself as a Jewish state.  
 
 
 
  35 
5. From Koenig to Herzliya – similarities 
and differences 
 
 
There is a similarity between the documents in that gender is apparently left out in 
the language. Unlike from the Koenig Memo, women are mentioned in the 
Herzliya documents, when discussing birth rates and employment. The women are 
in other words only mentioned as an exception, the unstated departing point is 
men until anything else is mentioned. Further, the Israeli Arabs are from time to 
time divided into sub-groups in Herzliya; f. ex in the so called Patriotic Survey 
where the Druze community is represented in a separate category. In the earlier 
Koenig document all Arabs were discussed as one homogenous group. In both 
documents the loyalty discourse is repeated, but we’ve noticed that over time the 
patriotic discourse tends to be more and more common. The same applies when it 
comes to the language concerning the threat from Islam and Islamic movements. 
In both documents Muslims are discussed as a threat or potential threat to the state 
of Israel.  However, in the Koenig Memo written under the height of the Cold 
War, the “Red Threat” is constituted as the biggest threat against the national 
security, fearing the labor unions and youth movements in the country. The 
Herzliya documents, most of it written in the post-9/11 period, addresses terrorism 
and Islam as the main danger to Israel, and the Western world. Another discursive 
difference between the documents is that Koenig doesn’t write about 
modernization or the quest to modernize the Arab population. On the contrary, 
Koenig is convinced that education and better economy increase the motives to 
engage in subversive activities and nationalism among the Israeli Arabs. Further, 
the Herzliya discusses the existence of discrimination and racism in the Israeli 
society (although they never talk about who is being subjected to the racism and 
by whom) something never mentioned in the Koenig Memo. Lastly, some 
concluding discursive similarities between our documents; the Israeli Arabs are at 
all times talked about as a problem for the state, never as an asset to the Israeli 
society. In addition, The Arab population is discursively situated in a cultural 
context, and their problems are explained in terms of “Arab culture”, and finally, 
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maybe the most crucial similarity is the absent voice of the minority which is 
evident in both the texts. They are objectified in a pathological way, talked about 
and ‘othered’.  
 
 
6. Controlling Images – Controlled 
Bodies; making the connections 
 
As we’ve seen above some discourses have changed, but it is our opinion that the 
main intersecting discourses of power are still prevalent. We think Netanyahu 
confirmed this at the Herzliya Conference 2003.  "If there is a demographic 
problem, and there is, it is with the Israeli Arabs who will remain Israeli citizens" 
(Alon & Benn, 2003). Said states that “Arabs are still just counted in numerous 
terms, as family producers. They are not valuable to the state and as political 
subjects they are invisible” (Said, 1978, p. 460), something that we find evident in 
our material. In a way the disciplinary regimes and the controlling images are 
more subtle in the Herzliya material and the language includes words associated 
with an including, liberal democracy, like ‘equality’, ‘discrimination’, even 
‘racism’ appears. However, we cannot see that the discursive position of the 
minority has changed in any fundamental ways in relation to the dominant society 
represented in Herzliya. They are still ascribed inherent features connected to their 
culture rather than their socio-economic status. They are presented as passive 
agents without the ability to change their situation. From a Foucauldian 
understanding of power we argue that the images in themselves reflect power 
relations; at the same time they reproduce knowledge and hierarchies (Foucault, 
1995, p. 27). The knowledge about the Israeli Arab accumulated in our material 
establishes similar controlling images. Not many representations challenge the 
stable division between Jews/Arabs and we sense a high degree of objectification 
and ‘othering’ in the different images of the Israeli Arab. We think bell hooks has 
described the process of objectification in a way that is significant for our thesis 
(and indeed for many native minorities in different contexts and spaces):  
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As subjects, people have the right to define their own reality, establish their own 
identities, name their history. As objects, one’s reality is defined by others, one’s 
identity created by others, one’s history named only in ways that define one’s 
relationship to those who are subject (hooks in Hill Collins, 2002, p. 71). 
 
These positions are connected to our methodological question of transitivity; not 
only who is the matter of the subject but also how they are talked about, and in 
relation to what or whom. This is a methodological question as well as a 
theoretical approach. ‘Otherness’ can be constructed through gendered processes 
as well as through racialized ones, and various processes intersect. The 
foundations of exclusions are double-edged where “invisibility is constructed 
through the notion that for example white women's experiences are taken for 
granted and given the status of the norm, they get to represent a specific category. 
Otherness on the other hand, is constructed through brutal visibility and racialized 
stereotypes, exotification and victimization (our translation)” (Mulinari in 
Mulinari, Sandell & Schörner, 2003, p. 26).  
 
In our particular study, we argue that demography as an institution was and still is 
a tool in the hands of Israeli state and its associated administrations. With the use 
of statistics, populations are observed and bodies classified. It is not only a system 
that functions downwards, it is also a disciplinary force directed at the dominant 
society, creating the image of an ideal and homogenous group. Not only is 
demography a controlling tool for the state, but over the years it seems like 
demography as an issue has been removed from the academic realm to the daily 
discourse (Galili, 2002). Of course, the statistical categories of ‘Jews’ and ‘Arabs’ 
hides a reality of a very diverse society and the identities are not in any way 
stable, even though our material discursively constructs them as such. Derrida 
argues that “a colonized, ethnic minority […] occupy a place of ‘cultural 
undecidability’” and in a dynamic where these margins continually are being 
reconfigured, “the concept of the univocal national subject is undone” (Derrida in 
Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2009, p. 86). We can see that the categories of both Arabs 
and Jews are more diverse and pluralistic in Herzliya. The categories are still firm, 
but groupings are added such as Muslims, Christians, Druze, Diaspora Jews and 
Ultra-Orthodox Jews. The Israeli society has changed since the Koenig Report, 
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social groups are reconstituted and exhibits subjects with multiple loyalties and 
hybrid identities, and so the social ordering changes. To produce an image of a 
'univocal national subject' is apparently not that easy. But as we will see, the 
adding of categories doesn’t necessarily change the racialized and gendered 
discourse.  
 
On the Herzliya conference 2002 it was stated that Israel was ranked 44
th
 in the 
world when it came to minority participation in the work force. Together with the 
Ultra-orthodox (although not counted as a minority group) the Israeli government 
has expressed concerns for the dependence of welfare among the Israeli Arabs. 
However, it is clearly stated that the Ultra-orthodox choose unemployment, unlike 
the unemployment of the Israeli Arabs which is “culturally dictated” (Herzliya, 
2002, p. 60). Here, the Ultra-orthodox community is described as active agents, 
with the ability to make a “free choice”, compared to the unemployed Israeli Arab 
(woman) who is not in a position to make active decisions. By explaining the 
Arab poverty as a cultural problem, it is naturalized, a nominalization process 
which effectively excludes other plausible causalities. This effectively disguises 
inequalities and structural forces responsible are made invisible. In her research 
on racialized images of the Black family, Angela Davis illustrates how poverty 
among African American families is naturalized;  
 
Creating the controlling image of the welfare mother and stigmatizing her as the 
cause of her own poverty and that of African-American communities shifts the angle 
of vision away from structural sources of poverty and blames the victims 
themselves. The image of the welfare mother thus provides ideological justification 
for the dominant group’s interest in limiting the fertility of Black mothers who are 
seen as producing too many economically unproductive children (Davis in Hill 
Collins, 2002, p. 80).  
 
Similarly, Herzliya associates the Arab family structure with social problems, 
reducing the problems of unemployment and poverty to a cultural one rather than 
consequences of inequality and structural socio-economic problems in the society 
as a whole.   
 
When reading the Herzliya documents’ proposals to promote increased access to 
the academic and employment sphere for the Israeli Arab women, it is easy to 
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think of it as a strategy to boost equality between women and men. But the tactic 
to reduce the time women spend in their private sphere is not once described in 
the documents as a strategy helping the women to increase their opportunities in 
life, only in terms of birth rates and taxes. Jacqueline Portugese concludes; 
“Although these attempts have been cloaked in feminist rhetoric, they are more a 
reflection of the state’s anti-natalist fertility goals that of anything else” 
(Portugese, 1998, p. 175). Thus, the state’s claims to modernize the Arab woman, 
to teach her and educate her can be seen from another perspective. As Portugese 
notes; a lack of concern for other facets of the Israeli Arab women’s oppression 
contravenes the Israeli government’s equality claims (Ibid. p. 176). It’s worth 
noticing that neither in Koenig nor in Herzliya is there a wish for a modernization 
of the Israeli Arab man. Even though he is described as hostile, aggressive and 
presumably patriarchal, he is not the one to change according to our material. The 
discourse of modernization is in this case only targeting the female; the man is a 
static construction unable to change.  
However, it is important to point out that the leaders of the Palestinian nationalist 
movement have not necessarily been reluctant participants in the discourse of the 
demographic race. Especially after the Koenig Memo was leaked to the public, the 
‘war on the baby front’ became bitter. Slogans like “The Israelis beat us on the 
borders but we beat them in the bedrooms” was heard (Yuval-Davis, 1987, p. 80), 
and Arafat has been quoted saying “they [the Israelis] are concerned about our 
children and the Palestinian woman, who bears yet another Palestinian every ten 
months … [the Israeli Arab woman] is a biological bomb threatening to blow up 
Israel from within” (Portugese, 1998, p. 165). The construction of the Palestinian 
woman as a reproducer of national identity had effect, and many Palestinian 
families outside and within Israel (Israeli Arabs) who were aware of the politics of 
demography refused Israel’s modernization discourse. They continued and still 
continue to have more children than Israeli families (Rousso-Schindler, N/A, p. 
7). Refusing the modernization discourse, or at least refuse to make connections 
between birth control and modernization, can be a way to resist the pressure from 
the Israeli population policies and the orientalist controlling image of the Arab 
woman as a backward and passive baby producer. The Palestinian woman can be 
an agent, free to use her maternal role as a source of resistance. In any way, as 
Patricia Hills Collins importantly concludes;  
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Women are important within nationalist philosophies, whether the nationalism is 
forwarded by dominant groups who wield nation-state power, or by subordinated 
groups who use nationalist ideologies to challenge their oppression. Groups on both 
sides of state power view the women in their group in particular ways (Hill Collins, 
2002, p. 230). 
 
However, some women emerge as more worthy mothers of the nation than others. 
The Arab women are not of value for the reproduction of a Zionist nation. The 
negative controlling image of Arab motherhood work to disqualify them as 
symbols of the nation. Parallels can be drawn to how working class Black women 
are constructed in a U.S. context. “[They] have been constructed as the enemy 
within, the group producing the population that threatens the American national 
interest of maintaining itself as a ‘White’ nation-state” (Hill-Collins, 2005, p. 
125).  
 
One aim of our thesis is to look further, what these controlling images reflect. 
How do they shape the image, of what Derrida calls, the univocal national subject 
being the Jewish majority? The function of the images is to present an idealized 
reality that we argue doesn’t exist. They distort reality, and hides structures of 
gender and race. To reconnect to Balibar (1990) communities has to be 
naturalized through a presented narrative of stable identities. Herzliya and Koenig 
is a part of this stratification process by discursively constructing divisions and 
hierarchies.  
 
As we said earlier the Ultra-Orthodox group is also pointed out as a problem (not 
in Koenig but in Herzliya) due to their poverty and high unemployment, and 
together with the Arab minority they score the lowest on every Patriot survey. 
They are not constructed as a threat to the Jewish state, but they are in a way 
'othered' and seen as apart from the Zionist secular, dominate society. The 
difference from the Arab minority is though that they have major political 
representation and influence (Herzog in Herzog & Braude, 2009, p. 53). It is hard 
to say why some groups gain more discursive influence than others when they 
from a socio-economic perspective seem quite similar. But as Yuval-Davis says: 
“racism occurs when the construction of ‘otherness’ is used in order to exclude 
and/or exploit the immutable ‘other’” (1997, p. 49). Further, Mohanty argues that 
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the creation of the ahistorical and homogenous ‘Third World Woman’-discourse 
was necessary for Western women in order to uphold their image of themselves as 
free subjects (Mulinari in Mulinari, Sandell & Schöner, 2003, p. 26).    
When comparing the Ultra-Orthodox with the Israeli Arabs a similar process is 
visualized. Even though the former group is, as mentioned before, discussed in 
terms of ‘unmodernity’ and ‘poverty’, they are seen as free subjects. In the end it 
is still the Israeli Arab who in a comparable way to the ‘Third World Woman’- 
discourse marks the boundary of the Jewish national identity.  
 
At the same time, the Ultra-Orthodox group together with the Arab minority and 
the Diaspora Jews (people of Jewish origin without Israeli citizenship) are 
considered an “unsecure card”, the Arabs and the Ultra-Orthodox because of their 
low level of patriotism, and the Diaspora Jews because of lack of identification 
and solidarity with the state of Israel (Herzliya, 2003, p. 8). Maybe, the need for 
the state to survey its population (and indeed its potential population) has spilled 
over to the some Jewish groups. To be a “real Jew”, in the eyes of Herzliya, you 
have to feel solidarity with Israel. We would argue that we can see a “tightening 
of the disciplinary regime” (Mills, 2012, p. 83), conducted through constant 
counting and analyzing of not only the Arab minority but also other groups as 
well. This does not necessarily change the positions of Israel’s Arab minority. In 
our recent material they are still perceived as a demographical, economical and 
security threat and still needed for the reasons emphasized by Herzog that “it is at 
the intersection of the demand for assimilation and resemblance accompanied by 
rejection and labeling that the dominant groups construct their identity” (2004, p. 
56). We argue that the controlling images in our material functions – among other 
things- in this particular way.  
 
6.1 Concluding comments 
 
Our methodological tools of nominalization and transitivity gave us an observant 
eye when working with the material. In every image there were traces of these 
processes and we have localized and analyzed them, finding that the most 
important and general processes of exclusion were still present in both the Koenig 
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Memo and the Herzliya Series. We could localize positions of the object/subject 
where the Israeli Arab in our images was described as objects without agency and 
with special characteristics, for example as in the image of the ‘dis-loyal’ and 
‘uncivilized’ Arab. We have also highlighted how the process of nominalization 
can naturalize for instance poverty and construct causalities as “commonsense” 
that does not need further explanation.   
 
The function of framing controlling images is to deconstruct an ideological 
system that justifies intersecting oppressions of race, class, gender, and sexuality 
and as interpreters we conceptualize those pictures in order analyze them 
according to our specific context and material. The discursive changes and 
similarities in our texts give us knowledge about the gendered and racialized 
power structures in Israel. It also confirms the importance of state-associated 
institutions in the role of accumulating knowledge and power. It takes an immense 
amount of social ordering, nominalization and 'othering' to keep the national, 
unified subject intact, a subject in constant changing. 
 
 
6.2 Further research 
 
 
We have touched upon many interesting issues that were outside the aim of this 
thesis, and there were crucial concepts that were not included. Israel is a very 
diverse country with many minority groups. We have addressed issues of race and 
gender, but we think that one important aspect to fully understand intersecting 
hierarchies is class. Not once in our material are socio-economic structures 
mentioned, whether the topic were Jews or Arabs. Apart from race and gender, 
class is another structure that cuts through all groups and divides the society. 
Sometimes it follows racialized or genderized hierarchies, and sometimes not as 
with the Ultra-Orthodox groups. We think there is a need to 'classify' the analysis 
of the Israeli society. Most studies we have read so far focus, for obvious reasons 
maybe, on race and gender. We think Ania Loomba articulates the relationship 
between colonialism, racial boundaries and class in a way that would be 
interesting to develop.  
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She argues that “the ideology of racial superiority translated easily into class 
terms” (2005, p. 109) and she describes how these ideologies naturalize class 
positions and poverty in a society. 
 
Another issue that can be furthered developed is power relations within the Jewish 
dominant groups. It also, of course, intersects with class. Nahla Abdo (2011) has 
done a comprehensive study of the racialization within the Jewish community that 
we found very interesting. She argues that the so called Ashkenazi Jews, Jews 
with Europe origin, dominate all aspects of the society also within the feminist 
field of research. Her main point is that the feminist writing in Israel 
conceptualizes gender structures from an ethnocentric notion that all women share 
similar experiences and that it does not conceptualize the racialized oppression of 
Mizrahi women, Jews with an Arab or North African heritage. In relations to that 
we read an article about Ethiopian Jews in a transit camp in Ethiopia (Nesher, 
2012). The journalist had interviewed some of the women who claimed that they 
were required to take quite dangerous contraceptives in order to be admitted in to 
Israel. The contraceptives were given by Israeli social works in the camp, in 
collaboration with the government. It would be interesting to dig deeper into this 
issue, in relations to racialized Jews in Israel. Which other groups are given free 
contraceptives? Why bring this group of Jews into the country if their future 
children are not desired? What challenges does this pose to the Israeli feminist 
movement? 
 
Another point of departure could be the image presented in our material of the 
groups of Ultra-orthodox Jews and the Diaspora Jews. As we discuss in the 
analysis, these groups are not unproblematic to the Israeli politicians meeting in 
Herzliya. They are talked about in different ways in the material, but the two 
groups are differentiated as Jewish groups that need to be dealt with, or 
“upgraded” as the material states. The Ultra-orthodox Jews because of their low 
participation in the workforce and the diaspora Jews because of their (presumed) 
lack of solidarity with Israel and their “assimilation” into their own countries of 
birth. In our more recent material it is mentioned several times that the 
assimilation of Jews in the world is a problem, a statement that surprised us for 
many reasons but mainly one. How can a social development that accepts Jews as 
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parts of a society on equal terms be a bad one? We would argue that this shows an 
inherent conflict of interest between Israel's struggle for the individual welfare of 
all Jews around the world, and the state's survival as a Jewish state with a Jewish 
majority. As we stated in our background chapter, the immigration of Jews has 
been vital to the demographic character of Israel. Due to the state's historical 
creation as a refugee state for persecuted Jews, what happens when immigration 
of Jews declines, implying that Israel is no longer needed for the particular reason 
of “rescuing Jews”? Does our material point to an identity crisis, where Israel 
finds itself in a position where more non-Jews than Jews are searching for its 
protection? Or a position where Jews from poorer countries like Ethiopia are the 
ones immigrating; welcomed under certain conditions?  
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“If I as an Arab woman do an MA and succeed in work, etc. 
...I become the subject of a study ...in fact, [what] ever I do 
becomes a subject for anthropological research...” (Herzog, 
2004, p. 78) 
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